Can One Solve the Problem of Evil by Appealing to Mystery? Part II, Critiquing Gutting

Gary Gutting's article cites John Gray's argument that religion's importance is based less on the content of a person's beliefs, and more about the way he or she lives. As we saw in Part I, Gutting writes that religion becomes problematic once belief in God and eternal life are seen to be centrally important.

You may have noticed that the title to these posts does not have much to do with the thrust of Gutting's argument. Gutting spends a great deal of time discussing theism and the problem of evil, but he doesn't do so because he is interested in addressing and answering the problem of evil. He does it because he wants to argue in favor of the idea that belief in theological assertions such as God exists, Jesus died to save sinners, etc. are not important. Good living is what is important.

To get there, Gutting attempts to discredit belief in God by using the problem of evil to try and show that, since God's wisdom and ways are so far beyond our understanding, we cannot ever know if salvation is possible. He conceives of God in terms of the ontological argument. And he characterizes the solution to the problem of evil only in terms of appeals to mystery.

From a Christian perspective, there are a number of problems with Gutting's argument. First, his conception of God is too narrowly defined. Second, he limits God's moral perfection and omnipotence. Third, he mischaracterizes God's motive and means of providing for salvation. Fourth, he misrepresents Christian answers to the problem of evil. And fifth, Gutting ignores divine revelation. The series will address each point individually.

1. His conception of God is too narrowly defined.

Gutting says, "Suppose, for example, we were to be entirely convinced that a version of the ontological argument, which claims to show that the very idea of an all-perfect being requires that such a being exist, is sound. We would then be entirely certain that there is a being of supreme power and goodness."

Fair enough. I happen to think that the ontological argument is sound, especially given the work done to strengthen the argument by Gutting's colleague at Notre Dame, Alvin Plantinga (arguably the sharpest Christian apologist of our time). But then Gutting misapplies the ontological argument by posing the question, "But what would this imply about our chances for eternal salvation?"

Gutting is right to say, "very little," if all he is allowing himself to go by is the God argued for in the ontological argument. St. Anselm developed the first form of the ontological argument in the eleventh century, mainly to help him understand, and have confidence in, the existence of God. In chapter 2 of the Proslogion, Anselm arrives at the ontological argument in a prayer to God, asking Him to add understanding and clarification to that which he already believed. Anselm is not attempting to clarify or define the doctrine of salvation. He addresses the doctrine of salvation in Cur Deus Homo. In the Proslogion, he is interested in deducing God's existence from the basic premise that, if God is the greatest conceivable being, then in order to have that measure of greatness, he must exist in reality and not merely in his own mind. Existing in reality makes God greater than existing as a figment of his imagination.

So, for Gutting to define God through the sole appeal to the ontological argument comes far short. The ontological argument is not designed to explain God's role in salvation, only God's existence. If Gutting wanted to understand God's role in salvation, he needed to appeal to a different basis than the one he chose. As a result, a key premise in his argument sets the Christian doctrine of God up as a straw man, and seriously undermines his argument up front.

Up next--Gutting limits God's moral perfection and omnipotence.